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Abstract
We characterize dominant strategy incentive compatibility with multi-dimensional
types. A social choice mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly
monotone (W-Mon). W-Mon is the following requirement: if changing one agent’s
type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the
social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities of the new and original
outcomes evaluated at the new type of this agent must be no less than this difference
in utilities evaluated at the original type of this agent.
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1 Introduction
We characterize dominant strategy incentive compatibility of deterministic social
choice functions in a model with multi-dimensional types. We show that incentive
compatibility is characterized by a simple monotonicity property of the social choice
function. This property, termed weak monotonicity (W-Mon), requires the following:
if changing one agent’s type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes
the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities
of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this agent must be
no less than this difference in utilities evaluated at his original type. In effect W-
Mon requires that the social choice function be sensitive to changes in differences in
utilities.
We restrict attention to a private-values, quasilinear-preferences setting. The
social choice function is deterministic in that randomization over the finite set of
outcomes is not permitted. We take as primitive a preference order for each agent
over the set of outcomes. These orders may be null, partial, or complete, and may
differ across agents. This formulation incorporates multi-object auctions. The notion
of incentive compatibility in this paper is dominant strategy, which is equivalent to
requiring Bayesian incentive compatibility for all possible priors (see Ledyard (1978)).
Thus, it is not necessary to assume that agents have priors over the types of all
agents (let alone the mutual or common knowledge of such priors) for the mechanisms
considered here. This weakening of common knowledge assumptions is in the spirit
of the Wilson doctrine (see Wilson (1987)).
Myerson (1981) showed that in a single object auction, a random allocation func-
tion is Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if each buyers’ probability of receiving
the object is non-decreasing in his type. However this monotonicity condition applies
only to single dimensional domains, in which a player’s type is determined by a single
real number. For multi-object auctions, as well as other general multi-dimensional
domains, the necessary and sufficient condition for Bayesian incentive compatibility is
that is that the random allocation rule be the subgradient of a convex function.1 We
show that when the incentive compatibility requirement is strengthened to dominant
strategy and only deterministic mechanisms are considered, then incentive compati-
bility in a multi-dimensional types setting is characterized by W-Mon, which is much
more intuitive than the subgradient condition. In particular, our condition is sig-
nificantly simpler than the “cyclic monotonicity” condition of Rochet (1987). The
resulting simplification of the constraint set for incentive compatibility should be
1See, for example, Rochet (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1988), Williams (1999), Krishna and
Perry (1997), Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996, 1999), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), Krishna
and Maennar (2001), and Milgrom and Segal (2002).
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helpful in applications such as in finding an expected revenue maximizing auction in
the class of deterministic dominant strategy auctions.
Our characterization also bears upon a framework where the mechanism designer
is interested in issues of efficiency rather than revenue. While the Vickery-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism is ex post efficient, there are reasons to be interested in
other (inefficient) incentive-compatible mechanisms. It is well known that because
of its computational complexity the VCG auction is infeasible for selling more than
a small number of objects. Several papers investigate computationally feasible (but
inefficient) auctions in private-values settings (see Nisan and Ronen (2000), Lehman et
al. (1999), and Holzman and Monderer (2004)). Characterizing the set of incentive-
compatible auctions facilitates the selection of an auction that is preferable to the
VCG auction on grounds of computational feasibility.
Roberts (1979) showed that in quasilinear environments with a complete domain,
a condition called positive association of differences (PAD) is necessary and suffi-
cient for dominant strategy incentive compatibility. Our paper considers a much
more restrictive domain of preferences than Roberts assumes. In particular, the PAD
condition is vacuous in our model as all social choice functions satisfy it.
The paper is organized as follows. The characterization of incentive compatibility
for a single agent model is developed in Sections 2 and 3. In Section 4, we describe
how this characterization extends easily to many agents. In Section 5, we discuss the
connections of our paper to other characterizations of incentive compatibility with
multi-dimensional types. We conclude in Section 6. Most proofs are given in an
Appendix. A few related examples and results are in the Supplementary Materials
to this paper, i.e., Bikhchandani et al. (2006).
2 A single agent model
Let A = {a1, a2, ..., aK} be a finite set of possible outcomes. We assume that the agent
has quasilinear preferences over outcomes and (divisible) money. The agent’s type,
which is his private information, determines his utility over outcomes. The utility of
an agent of type V over outcome a and money m is:
U(a,m, V ) = U(a, V ) + m, a ∈ A.
The domain of V is D ⊆ #K+ . It is convenient to assume that the agent’s initial en-
dowment of money is normalized to zero and he can supply any (negative) quantity
required. We will sometimes write V (a), V ′(a) instead of U(a, V ), U(a, V ′) respec-
tively.
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A social choice function f is a function from the agent’s report to an outcome in the
set A. As we are interested in truth-telling social choice functions, by the revelation
principle we restrict attention to direct mechanisms. Thus, f : D → A. We assume,
without loss of generality, that f is onto A. A payment function p : D → # is a
function from the agent’s reported type to a money payment by the agent. A social
choice mechanism (f, p) consists of a social choice function f and a payment function
p.
A social choice mechanism is truth-telling if truthfully reporting his type is optimal
(i.e., is a dominant strategy) for the agent:
U(f(V ), V )− p(V ) ≥ U(f(V ′), V )− p(V ′), ∀V, V ′ ∈ D. (1)
A social choice function f is truthful if there exists a payment function p such that
(f, p) is truth-telling; p is said to implement f .
Consider the following restriction on the allocation mechanism. A social choice
function f is weakly monotone (W-Mon) if for every V, V ′,
U(f(V ′), V ′)− U(f(V ), V ′) ≥ U(f(V ′), V )) − U(f(V ), V ). (2)
If f satisfies W-Mon, then the difference in the agent’s utility between f(V ′) and
f(V ) at V ′ is greater than or equal to this difference at V .
W-Mon is a simple and intuitive condition on social choice functions. In effect, it
is a requirement that the social choice function be sensitive to changes in differences
in utilities. It is easy to see that W-Mon is a necessary condition for truth-telling:
Lemma 1 If (f, p) is a truth-telling social choice mechanism then f is W-Mon.
Proof: Let (f, p) be a truth-telling social choice mechanism. Consider two types V
and V ′ of the agent. By the optimality of truth-telling at V and V ′ respectively, we
have
U(f(V ), V )− p(V ) ≥ U(f(V ′), V )− p(V ′)
and U(f(V ′), V ′)− p(V ′) ≥ U(f(V ), V ′)− p(V )
These two inequalities imply that
U(f(V ′), V ′)− U(f(V ), V ′) ≥ p(V ′)− p(V )
≥ U(f(V ′), V )− U(f(V ), V ).
Hence f satisfies W-Mon.
Next, we obtain conditions on D, the domain of the agent’s types, under which
W-Mon is sufficient for truth-telling.
3
3 Sufficiency of W-Mon
If the domain of the agent’s types, D, is not large enough then W-Mon is not sufficient
for truth-telling. This is clear from the following example.
Example 1: There are three outcomes a1, a2, and a3. The agent’s type is a vector
representing his utilities for these outcomes. The agent has three possible types:
V 1 = (0, 55, 70), V 2 = (0, 60, 85), V 3 = (0, 40, 75).2 That is, D = {V 1, V 2, V 3}.
The social choice function f(V 1) = a1, f(V 2) = a2, and f(V 3) = a3 is W-Mon on
the set D because:
V 2(a2)− V 2(a1) = 60 − 0 ≥ 55 − 0 = V 1(a2)− V 1(a1)
V 3(a3)− V 3(a2) = 75 − 40 ≥ 85 − 60 = V 2(a3)− V 2(a2)
V 1(a1)− V 1(a3) = 0 − 70 ≥ 0 − 75 = V 3(a1)− V 3(a3)
However, there is no payment function that implements f . Suppose that the agent
pays p1 at report V 1, p2 at report V 2, and p3 at report V 3. Without loss of generality,
let p1 = 0. For truth-telling we must have p2 ≥ 55, else type V 1 would report V 2.
Similarly, p3 − p2 ≥ 25 else type V 2 would report V 3. Therefore, we must have
p3 ≥ 80. But then type V 3 would report V 1.
Even if the domain of types is connected, W-Mon is not sufficient for truthfulness.
Let Dˆ be the sides of the triangle with corners V 1, V 2, and V 3 defined above. The
allocation rule fˆ is as follows: fˆ(V ) = a1, ∀V ∈ [V 1, V 3), fˆ(V ) = a2, ∀V ∈ [V 2, V 1),
and fˆ(V ) = a3, ∀V ∈ [V 3, V 2).3 It may be verified that fˆ satisfies W-Mon but there
are no payments that induce truth-telling under fˆ . (
Requiring W-Mon on a larger domain (than in the example) strengthens this
condition. To this end, we define order-based preferences over the possible outcomes.
Order-based domains: We restrict attention to domains D ⊆ RK+ . In certain
contexts, regardless of his type, the agent has an order of preference over some of the
outcomes in the set A. In a multi-object auction, for instance, where an outcome is
the bundle of objects allocated to the agent, if a! ⊂ ak, then under free disposal it is
natural that the agent prefers ak to a! and V (a!) ≤ V (ak) for all V ∈ D. Therefore,
we take as a primitive the finite set of outcomes A and a (weak) order + on it. This
order may be null, partial, or complete.
A type V is consistent with respect to (A,+) if ak + a! implies V (ak) ≥ V (a!). A
domain of types D is consistent with respect to (A,+) if every type in D is consistent
2Thus, V 1(a1) = 0, V 1(a2) = 55, and V 1(a3) = 70 and so on.
3Here [V 1, V 3) denotes the half-open line segment joining V 1 to V 3 etc.
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with respect to (A,+). We will sometimes write domain D on (A,+) to mean D is
consistent with respect to (A,+).
If + is null then D is an unrestricted domain in the sense that for any ak, a! ∈ A,
there may exist V, V ′ ∈ D such that V (ak) > V (a!) and V ′(ak) < V ′(a!). If, instead,
+ is a partial order then D is a partially ordered domain: for any ak, a! ∈ A if
ak + a! then V (ak) ≥ V (a!) for all V ∈ D. If + is a complete order then D is a
completely ordered domain: for any ak, a! ∈ A either V (ak) ≥ V (a!) for all V ∈ D
or V (ak) ≤ V (a!) for all V ∈ D depending on whether ak + a! or ak , a!.
Examples:
(i) As already mentioned, in a multi-object auction the set of outcomes A is a list
of possible subsets of objects that the agent might be allocated. The order + is the
partial order induced by set inclusion.
(ii) A multi-unit auction is a special case of a multi-object auction in which all objects
are identical. Let the outcomes be the number of objects allocated to the agent. Thus,
for any ak, a! ∈ A either ak ≤ a! or a! ≤ ak; accordingly either ak , a! or ak + a!
and + is a complete order.
(iii) Another special case is when the agent has assignment model preferences over
K − 1 heterogeneous objects. Let the outcome a1 denote no object assigned to the
agent, and let ak+1, k = 1, 2, ..., K − 1, denote the assignment of the kth object to
the agent. The allocation of more than one object to the agent is not permitted. The
underlying order is ak + a1, for all k ≥ 2, and ak -+ a!, for all k, ! ≥ 2, k -= !. (
In an auction, there is an outcome at which the agent does not get any object;
the utility of this outcome is 0 for all types of the agent. The proofs in Section 3.2
(but not in Section 3.1) require the existence of such an outcome.
The inverse of a social choice function f is
Y (k) ≡ {V ∈ D | f(V ) = ak}.
For any k, ! ∈ {1, 2, ..., K}, define4
δk! ≡ inf{V (ak)− V (a!) |V ∈ Y (k)}. (3)
Note that δkk = 0. The following lemma will be useful in the sequel.
Lemma 2 For any social choice choice function f and ak, a!, ar ∈ A we have:
(i) If ak + a! then δrk ≤ δr!.
(ii) W-Mon implies that δk! ≥ −δ!k.
4The dependence of Y and of δk! on the social choice function f is suppressed for notational
convenience.
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Proof: (i) As V (ak) ≥ V (a!) for all V , including V ∈ Y (r), we have V (ar)−V (ak) ≤
V (ar)− V (a!), ∀V ∈ Y (r). Therefore, δrk ≤ δr!.
(ii) By W-Mon, V (ak)− V (a!) ≥ V ′(ak)− V ′(a!), ∀V ∈ Y (k), V ′ ∈ Y (!). Thus,
δk! = inf{V (ak)− V (a!) |V ∈ Y (k)} ≥ sup{V (ak)− V (a!) |V ∈ Y (!)}
= − inf{V (a!)− V (ak) |V ∈ Y (!)} = −δ!k
Next, we prove sufficiency of W-Mon for partially ordered domains.
3.1 Partially ordered domains
Recall that the set of outcomes is A = (a1, a2, ..., aK). Throughout Section 3.1 we
make the following assumption on the domain of types.
Rich domain assumption: Let D be a domain of types on (A,+). Then D is rich
if every V ∈ RK+ that is consistent with (A,+) belongs to D.
Thus, if + is null then D = #K+ . If, instead, + is a partial order then D is the
largest subset of #K+ satisfying inequalities V (ak) ≥ V (a!) whenever ak + a! for all
ak, a! ∈ A. It is easily verified that the formulations of the auction examples of the
previous section admit rich domains.
Next, we define a payment function that implements a social choice function
satisfying W-Mon on a rich domain. Relabelling the outcomes if necessary, let aK
be an outcome such that no other outcome is always weakly preferred to it; that is,
for each a! ∈ A there exists a V ∈ D such that V (aK) > V (a!).5 If + is null, any
outcome has this property. If + is a non-null partial order then any outcome which
is maximal under + may be selected as aK .6 Consider the payment function
pk ≡ −δKk, ∀k = 1, 2, ..., K. (4)
That is, if V ∈ Y (k) then an agent who reports V pays pk (and the outcome ak is
selected by f). We use the next result to show that p implements f .
Lemma 3 Let f be a social choice function that is W-Mon. For any a! ∈ A and
V ∈ D,
(i) If V (a!)− p! < V (aK)− pK then f(V ) -= a!.
(ii) If V (a!)− p! > V (aK)− pK then f(V ) -= aK.
5Note that if a! -+ aK then, as D is rich, there exists such a V .
6In a multi-object auction, aK is any maximal subset (with respect to set inclusion) in the range
of the mechanism. Thus, if the outcome at which all objects are allocated to the agent is in the
range of the mechanism then this outcome is aK .
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This leads to the main result for partially ordered domains.
Theorem 1 A social choice function on a rich domain is truthful if and only if it is
weakly monotone.
As already observed, the smaller the domain of types on which the social choice
mechanism satisfies W-Mon, the weaker the restriction imposed by W-Mon. There-
fore, next we investigate whether W-Mon is sufficient for truth-telling when the do-
main is not rich, in particular the domain is bounded. To obtain a sufficiency result
with smaller domain assumptions, we make the stronger assumption that the under-
lying order is complete.
3.2 Completely ordered domains
The order + on the set of outcomes is complete. That is, for any ak, a! ∈ A, either
ak + a! or a! + ak but not both.7 Thus, for any domain D consistent with (A,+)
either V (ak) ≥ V (a!) for all V ∈ D or V (a!) ≥ V (ak) for all V ∈ D. We label the
outcomes such that ak + ak−1, k = 1, 2, ..., K. Define for each type V the marginal
(or incremental) utility of the kth outcome over the (k − 1)th outcome:
vk ≡ V (ak)− V (ak−1) ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, ..., K.
For notational simplicity, we have K+1 outcomes rather than K. Further, we assume
that the utility of outcome a0 is the same for each type in D, and we normalize
V (a0) ≡ 0, ∀V ∈ D.
A multi-unit auction has a completely ordered domain, with the number of units
allocated to the buyer being the outcomes. Therefore, we denote the set of outcomes
as A = {0, 1, 2, ..., K} (rather than {a0, a1, ..., aK}). It is convenient to define the
agent’s type in terms of marginal utilities v = (v1, v2, ..., vK) for each successive unit
(rather than total utilities V = (V (1), V (2), ..., V (K)). The social choice and pay-
ment functions map marginal utilities to an outcome k = 0, 1, ..., K and to payments
respectively. The inverse social choice function Y (·) maps integers k = 0, 1, ..., K to
subsets of types (in marginal utility space).
Using (2), we see that in this context W-Mon may be restated as follows. A social
choice rule f is W-Mon if for every v and v′,
If f(v′) > f(v) then
f(v′)∑
!=f(v)+1
v′! ≥
f(v′)∑
!=f(v)+1
v!. (5)
7If the agent is indifferent between any two outcomes, we can recombine them into one outcome.
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Suppose that f is the allocation rule of a multi-unit auction and that the agent is
allocated more units by the mechanism when his (reported) type is v′ than when it
is v. If f is W-Mon then the agent’s valuation at v′ for the additional units allocated
at v′ is at least as large as his valuation at v.
The domain in Example 1 is completely ordered but W-Mon is not sufficient for
truthfulness; therefore, we need a larger domain. The following assumption encom-
passes both bounded utilities and diminishing marginal utilities.8
Bounded domain assumption: There exist constants a¯k ∈ (0,∞), k = 1, 2, ..., K,
such that the domain of agent types, D, satisfies either (A) or (B) below:
A. D = ΠKk=1[0, a¯k]
B. D is the convex hull of points (a¯1, a¯2, ..., a¯k−1, a¯k, 0, ..., 0), k = 0, 1, ..., K.
The assumption that a¯k <∞ for all k is not essential, but does simplify the proofs.
Domain assumption A does not restrict the marginal utilities to be decreasing (or
increasing). We do not specifically assume that a¯k ≥ a¯k+1, but when this inequal-
ity holds for all k and domain assumption B is satisfied, then we have diminishing
marginal utilities; that is, vk ≥ vk+1 for all v ∈ D.9 Under domain assumption B,
v = (v1, v2, ..., vK) ∈ D if and only if 0 ≤ v! ≤ a¯!, ∀! and
v!
a¯!
≥ v!+1
a¯!+1
! = 1, 2, ..., K − 1. (6)
Recalling the definition in (3), note that
δk k−1 = inf{vk | v ∈ Y (k)}
(7)
δk−1 k = − sup{vk | v ∈ Y (k − 1)}.
Next, a “tie-breaking at boundaries” assumption, TBB, is invoked to deal with
difficulties at the boundary of the domain.
Tie-breaking at boundaries (TBB): A social choice function f satisfies TBB if:
(i) vk > 0 for all v ∈ Y (k), and
(ii) vk < a¯k for all v ∈ Y (k − 1).
8The domain of types is referred to by D rather than D as types now specify marginal utilities
rather than total utilities. However, we continue to use the symbol Y (·) for the inverse social choice
function, which now maps outcomes into subsets of D.
9A straightforward modification extends the proofs to the case of increasing marginal utilities,
i.e., when D is the convex hull of points (0, 0, ...0, a¯k, a¯k+1, ..., a¯K), k = 1, ...,K and (0, 0, ..., 0).
The assumption of increasing marginal utilities obtains when the objects are complements, such as
airwave spectrum rights.
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Consider TBB(i). If δk k−1 > 0 then TBB(i) imposes no restriction. If, instead,
δk k−1 = 0 then there exists a sequence vn ∈ Y (k) such that limn→∞ vnk = 0; the
existence of a point v ∈ Y (k) at which vk = δk k−1 = 0 is precluded by TBB(i).
Similarly, TBB(ii) imposes no restriction if −δk−1 k < a¯k, and if, instead, −δk−1 k = a¯k
it requires that for any v ∈ Y (k − 1), we have vk < a¯k.
First, we prove sufficiency of W-Mon and TBB (Lemmas 4 and 5) for truth-
telling. We then show (Lemma 6) that (i) for any W-Mon social choice function f
there exists a social choice function f ′ that satisfies W-Mon and TBB and agrees
with f almost everywhere, and (ii) the money payments which truthfully implement
f ′ also truthfully implement f .
By Lemma 2(ii), W-Mon implies δk k−1 ≥ −δk−1 k. If in addition TBB is satisfied
then the weak inequality is replaced by an equality:
Lemma 4 Let f be a social choice function on a completely ordered, bounded domain.
If f satisfies W-Mon and TBB then a¯k ≥ δk k−1 = −δk−1 k ≥ 0 for all k.
It is clear from (7) that v! ≥ δ! !−1 for any v ∈ Y (!) and v′! ≤ −δ!−1 ! for any
v′ ∈ Y (!− 1). This, together with Lemma 4, implies that v′! ≤ −δ!−1 ! = δ! !−1 ≤ v!.
In fact, there exist v ∈ Y (!) and v′ ∈ Y (! − 1) such that v! and v′! are arbitrarily
close to δ! !−1. In other words, the hyperplane v! = δ! !−1 weakly separates Y (!) and
Y (!− 1).
Construct a payment function using the δ! !−1’s as follows:
pk ≡
{∑k
!=1 δ! !−1, if ! = 1, 2, ..., K
0, if ! = 0.
(8)
This payment function is shown to truthfully implement a social choice function
satisfying W-Mon and TBB.
Lemma 5 A social choice function on a completely ordered, bounded domain is truth-
ful if it satisfies W-Mon and TBB.
The next lemma allows us to dispense with TBB in the sufficient condition for
truth-telling. The proof is in the Supplementary Material.
Lemma 6 If a social choice mechanism f satisfies W-Mon then there exists an al-
location mechanism f ′ which satisfies W-Mon and TBB such that f(v) = f ′(v), for
almost all v ∈ D. Moreover, the payment function p′k defined as in (8) with respect
to f ′ truthfully implements f .
Lemma 6 assures us that given any social choice function f that satisfies W-Mon
we can construct another social choice function f ′ which is W-Mon and TBB. By
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Lemma 5, f ′ is truthful and by Lemma 6 the payment function which implements
f ′ also implements f . Thus, W-Mon is sufficient for truth-telling. This leads to the
main result for completely ordered domains.
Theorem 2 A social choice function on a completely ordered bounded domain is
truthful if and only if it is weakly monotone.
An alternative characterization for the single agent, completely ordered domain
model is through the payment function rather than the social choice function. Con-
sider a multi-unit auction with one buyer. The allocation rule “induced” by any
increasing payment function (pk ≥ pk−1 ≥ 0) is implementable. We note that this
characterization becomes considerably more complex when one considers two or more
buyers. This is because each buyer’s payment function will, in general, depend on oth-
ers’ reported types and for each vector of types, it must be verified that the induced
allocation rule does not distribute more units than are available. Our characteriza-
tion based on W-Mon is easily generalized to multi-agent settings, both for completely
ordered and partially ordered domains.
4 Extension to multiple agents
We extend the results of the single agent model to multiple agents, with each agent
having private values over the possible outcomes. For concreteness, we use the set-up
of Section 3.1; an identical argument extends the results of Section 3.2.
There are i = 1, 2, ..., n agents and the finite set of outcomes is A = {a1, a2, ..., aL}.
Agent i’s type is denoted by Vi = (Vi1, Vi2, ..., Vi!, ..., ViL), where each Vi ∈ Di ⊆ #L+.
The characteristics of all the agents are denoted by V = (V1, V2, ..., Vi, ..., Vn).10 The
private-values assumption is that each agent’s utility function depends only on his
type. Thus, when the types are V = (Vi, V−i), agent i’s utility over the outcome a
and m units of money is Ui(a,m, (Vi, V−i)) = Ui(a, Vi) + m, a ∈ A.
The outcome set A is endowed with (partial) orders, +i, i = 1, 2, ..., n, one for
each agent. The domain of agents’ types, D = D1 × D2 × . . . × Dn, is consistent
with (A, +1,+2, ...,+n) if each Di, the domain of agent i’s types, is consistent with
(A,+i). Further, D is rich if each Di is rich (as defined in Section 3.1).
In an auction, A represents the set of possible assignments of objects to agents
(buyers). If buyer i cares only about the objects allocated to him, then the partial
order +i is determined by set inclusion on the respective allocations to buyer i at
10In a departure from the notation of Section 3, V now refers to a profile of utilities for n agents
rather than for a single agent.
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a, a′ ∈ A. Thus, a ∼i a′, (i.e., Ui(a, Vi) = Ui(a′, Vi), ∀Vi ∈ Di) whenever a and a′
allocate the same bundle of objects to buyer i.
A social choice function f is a mapping from the domain of all agents’ (reported)
types onto A, f : D → A. For each agent i there is a payment function pi : D → #.
Let p = (p1, p2, ..., pn). The pair (f, p) is a social choice mechanism. A social choice
mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible if truthfully reporting one’s
type is a dominant strategy for each agent. That is, for every i, Vi, V ′i , V−i,
Ui(f(Vi, V−i), Vi)− pi((Vi, V−i)) ≥ Ui(f(V ′i , V−i), Vi)− pi(V ′i , V−i). (9)
A social choice function f is dominant strategy implementable if there exist payment
functions p such that (f, p) is dominant strategy incentive compatible.
The following definition generalizes weak monotonicity to a multiple agent setting.
A social choice function f is weakly monotone (W-Mon) if for every i, Vi, V ′i , V−i,
Ui(f(V ′i , V−i), V
′
i )− Ui(f(Vi, V−i), V ′i ) ≥ Ui(f(V ′i , V−i), Vi) − Ui(f(V ′i , V−i), Vi). (10)
Observe that the requirement of dominant strategy, (9), is the same as requiring
truth-telling (i.e. (1)) for each agent i, for each value of V−i. Further, (10) is equivalent
to requiring (2) for each agent i, for each value of V−i. Thus, Theorem 1 (and similarly
also Theorem 2) generalize:
Theorem 3 (i) A social choice function on a rich domain is dominant strategy im-
plementable if and only if it is weakly monotone.
(ii) A social choice function on a completely ordered, bounded domain is dominant
strategy implementable if and only if it is weakly monotone.
5 Relationship to earlier work
In his seminal paper, Myerson (1981) showed that a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for incentive compatibility of a single object auction is that each buyer’s prob-
ability of receiving the object is non-decreasing in his reported valuation.11 Several
authors, including Rochet (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1988), Williams (1999), Kr-
ishna and Perry (1997), Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996, 1999), Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2001), Krishna and Maennar (2001), and Milgrom and Segal (2002), have
extended Myerson’s analysis to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for Bayesian
incentive-compatible mechanisms in the presence of multi-dimensional types. These
results are easily adapted to dominant strategy mechanisms.
11Myerson characterized Bayesian incentive compatibility when agents’ types are one dimensional;
simple modifications to his proofs yield a similar characterization for dominant strategy incentive
compatibility. Myerson’s characterization coincides with W-Mon applied to one dimensional types.
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To place our results in the context of this earlier work, let G be a (random)
social choice function that maps the domain of agents’ types D to a probability
distribution over the set of outcomes A = {a1, a2, . . . , aL}. Thus, for each V ∈ D,
G(V ) = (g1(V ), g2(V ), ..., g!(V ), ..., gL(V )) is a probability distribution. Recall that
the payment functions are p = (p1, p2, ..., pn). A social choice mechanism (G, p)
induces the following payoff function for agent i:
Πi(Vi, V−i) ≡ G(Vi, V−i) · Vi − pi(Vi, V−i),
where x · y denotes the dot product of two vectors x and y. Dominant strategy
incentive compatibility implies that for all i, Vi, V ′i , V−i,
Πi(Vi, V−i) ≥ G(V ′i , V−i) · Vi − pi(V ′i , V−i)
= Πi(V
′
i , V−i) + G(V
′
i , V−i) · (Vi − V ′i ), (11)
=⇒ Πi(Vi, V−i) = max
V ′i
{G(V ′i , V−i) · Vi − pi(V ′i , V−i)}
As Πi( ·, V−i) is the maximum of a family of linear functions, it is a convex function
of Vi. Further, for each i and V−i, G( ·, V−i) is a subgradient of Πi( ·, V−i). This leads
to the following characterization: A social choice function G is dominant strategy
implementable if and only if for each V−i, G( ·, V−i) is a subgradient of a convex
function from Di to #.
A function G( ·, V−i) : Di → #L, Di ⊆ #L, is cyclically monotone if for every finite
selection V ji ∈ Di, j = 1, 2, ...,m, with V m+1i = V 1i ,
m∑
j=1
V ji · [G(V ji , V−i)−G(V j+1i , V−i)] ≥ 0. (12)
A function is a subgradient of a convex function if and only if it is cyclically monotone
(Rockafellar (1970, p. 238)). Thus, cyclic monotonicity of the social choice function
also characterizes dominant strategy implementability. The rationalizability condition
of Rochet (1987) generalizes the cyclic monotonicity characterization of incentive
compatibility to settings where the utility function is possibly non-linear.
W-Mon is a weaker condition than cyclic monotonicity in that W-Mon requires
(12) only for m = 2.12 Thus, our contribution is to show that when one restricts
attention to deterministic social choice functions, dominant strategy incentive com-
patibility is characterized by the simpler condition of W-Mon. Rochet’s cyclic mono-
tonicity condition requires that inequality (12) be checked for all finite selections of
types, whereas W-Mon requires the inequality to be verified only for every pair of
types.
12Note that if m = 2 then (12) may be restated as [G(V ′i , V−i)−G(Vi, V−i)] · (V ′i − Vi) ≥ 0 for all
Vi, V ′i . This is the same as (10), with Ui(G(Vi, V−i), Vi) = G(Vi, V−i) · Vi, etc.
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It is well known that with multi-dimensional types, characterizations of incen-
tive compatibility are complex. For one dimensional types, cyclic monotonicity is
equivalent to W-Mon which is equivalent to a non-decreasing subgradient function
(Rockafellar (1970, p. 240)). Hence, Myerson’s characterization of incentive com-
patibility as a non-decreasing allocation function. W-Mon, which generalizes the
concept of a non-decreasing function, does not characterize incentive compatibility in
a multi-dimensional setting with random mechanisms; the more complex condition of
cyclic monotonicity is needed. However, when attention is restricted to deterministic
mechanisms then we show that the simpler condition of W-Mon is enough. Thus
our paper helps delineate the boundaries of multi-dimensional models which permit
a simple characterization of incentive compatibility.
Although our characterization is significantly simpler, the restriction to deter-
ministic mechanisms may be a limitation. Manelli and Vincent (2003) and Thanas-
soulis (2004) show that a multi-product monopolist can strictly increase profits by
using a random, rather than deterministic, mechanism. Example S1 in the Supple-
mentary Materials establishes that for random social choice functions W-Mon is not
sufficient for dominant strategy implementability.13 Whether there is an intuitive
condition, which in conjunction with W-Mon, is sufficient for incentive compatibility
of random social choice functions is an open question.
Roberts (1979) characterizes deterministic dominant strategy mechanisms in quasi-
linear environments with a “complete” domain. Roberts identifies a condition called
positive association of differences (PAD) which is satisfied by a social choice function
f if for all V = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn) and V ′ = (V ′1 , V
′
2 , . . . , V
′
n)
if Ui(f(V ), V
′
i )− Ui(a, V ′i ) > Ui(f(V ), Vi)− Ui(a, Vi), ∀a -= f(V ), ∀i,
then f(V ′) = f(V ). (13)
An allocation rule f is an affine maximizer if there exist constants γi ≥ 0, with at
least one γi > 0, and a function U0 : A→ # such that
f(V ) ∈ argmax
a∈A
(
U0(a) +
n∑
i=1
γiUi(a, Vi)
)
.
Roberts (1979) shows that f is a (deterministic) dominant strategy mechanism if and
only if f satisfies PAD if and only if f is an affine maximizer.
What is the relationship between Roberts’ work and ours? The fundamental
difference is that Roberts assumes an unrestricted domain of preferences while we
operate in a restricted domain. In particular, Roberts requires that for all a ∈ A, any
real number α, and any agent i, there exists a type Vi of agent i such that Ui(a, Vi) = α.
13We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this example.
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Thus, taking (A, +1,+2, . . . ,+n) and the domain of types as primitives of the two
models, in Roberts’ model +i is a null order and Di = #L for each agent i,14 whereas
we allow each +i to be a non-null (even complete) order and the corresponding Di
to be a strict subset of #L+. Thus, an auction or any mechanism that allocates
(private) goods does not satisfy Roberts’ domain assumptions as they preclude free
disposal and no externalities in consumption. Indeed, in an auction with two or more
buyers PAD is vacuous in that all mechanisms satisfy PAD.15 W-Mon, however, is not
vacuous in this setting and is the appropriate condition for incentive compatibility.16
Because a smaller domain (than Roberts’) is sufficient for our characterization, one
may suspect that W-Mon is stronger than PAD. This is proved in Lemma S1 in
the Supplementary Materials. As already noted, in multi-agent models PAD does
not imply W-Mon. Example S2 in the Supplementary Materials presents a single
agent model in which a social choice mechanism satisfies PAD but not W-Mon; this
mechanism is, of course, not incentive compatible. An important difference between
these two conditions is that PAD is defined for changes in types of any combination
of players, while W-Mon is defined for changes in exactly one player’s type.
Thus, W-Mon and PAD are not equivalent. Further, because of the domain restric-
tions inherent in our model, our result is not a consequence of the characterization
result of Roberts. It may be useful conceptually to draw an approximate parallel
with the results on dominant strategy incentive compatibility in various domains.
According to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, dominant strategy is equivalent
to dictatorship in an unrestricted domain (subject to a range assumption). In the
quasilinear model (with otherwise unrestricted domain), Roberts showed that dom-
inant strategy, PAD, and the existence of affine maximizers are equivalent. In the
more restricted economic environments of auctions, where agents care only about
their private consumption, the equivalence of these three concepts breaks down; in
particular, PAD is necessary (and in the multi-buyer case vacuously so) but not suffi-
cient for dominant strategy. The domain restrictions inherent in auctions imply that
a wider class of allocation rules is incentive compatible. But if PAD is strengthened
to W-Mon, then we recover equivalence between dominant strategy and W-Mon.17
Although it is stronger than PAD, W-Mon is much weaker than cyclic monotonic-
ity which has been used to characterize incentive compatibility in multi-dimensional
settings (Rochet (1987)).
14Di = #L, for all i, is essential for Roberts’ proofs.
15Let a differ from f(V ) in the allocation to exactly one buyer. Then the hypothesis in (13) is
false as the inequality holds for at most one and not for all buyers.
16In our search for conditions that might be necessary and sufficient on even smaller domains than
considered here, we examined two conditions that strengthen W-Mon in a natural way. However,
neither of these two conditions is necessary. See Example S3 in Supplementary Materials.
17W-Mon by itself does not imply affine maximization. Lavi, Mu’alem, and Nisan (2003) identify
an additional property which together with W-Mon implies affine maximization.
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Chung and Ely (2002) obtain a characterization of incentive compatibility which
they call pseudo-efficiency. They show that f is dominant strategy implementable if
and only if there exist real-valued functions wi(a, Vi) such that for each V ,
f(V ) ∈ argmax
a∈A
(
Ui(a, Vi) + wi(a, Vi)
)
, ∀i.
W-Mon must therefore be equivalent to pseudo-efficiency. However, we believe that
W-Mon is, in some ways, a more insightful condition than pseudo-efficiency. For
instance, the definition of the latter involves an existential quantifier which makes it
hard to verify.
6 Concluding remarks
Characterizations of incentive compatibility with multi-dimensional types are far from
simple. By restricting attention to deterministic, dominant strategy mechanisms we
obtain a substantial simplification. In particular, the W-Mon condition clarifies the
structure of incentive-compatible auctions. The resulting simplification of the con-
straint set for incentive compatibility will be of use in identifying revenue-maximizing
auctions within the class of deterministic dominant strategy mechanisms. Another
possible application of our characterization is to practical auctions. Starting with the
auction of spectrum rights in the U.S. in the mid-nineties, new market institutions
have been proposed for selling multiple heterogeneous objects. Simple characteriza-
tions such as ours can be used to check the incentive properties of these institutions.18
Our strategy has been to start with W-Mon, a monotonicity condition necessary
for dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and show that when applied to a large
enough domain of agent types, W-Mon is also sufficient. In principle, this approach
can also be applied to Bayesian incentive compatibility. However, first the problem
of extending this approach to random mechanisms must be solved (see Section 5).19
18To our knowledge, all the recently proposed market mechanisms are deterministic except, of
course, when there are ties. Thus a restriction to deterministic mechanisms does not seem to be a
limitation in these applications.
19The distinction between random and deterministic social choice functions is less useful for
Bayesian mechanisms. A Bayesian agent views a social choice function as a function of his type
alone, which is a probability distribution over outcomes.
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7 Appendix: Proofs of Sections 3.1 & 3.2
Proof of Lemma 3: (i) By definition, pK = 0 and p! = −δK!. Therefore, V (a!) −
V (aK) < −δK! ≤ δ!K , where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2(ii). The
definition of δ!K implies that f(V ) -= a!.
(ii) In the other direction we have V (aK)−V (a!) < pK−p! = δK! implies f(V ) -= aK .
Proof of Theorem 1: In view of Lemma 1, we need only show sufficiency of W-Mon.
In particular, we show that the payment function defined in (4) truthfully implements
any social choice function f which is W-Mon. Suppose to the contrary that there
exists k∗, k and V ∈ Y (k∗) such that V (ak∗) − pk∗ < V (ak) − pk. Lemma 3(i) and
(ii) imply that k -= K and k∗ -= K respectively (else it would contradict V ∈ Y (k∗)).
Further, Lemma 3(i) implies that V (ak∗) − pk∗ ≥ V (aK) − pK (= V (aK)). Choose a
γ > 0 and a small enough % > 0 such that
V (ak∗) + %− pk∗ < V (aK) + γ − pK < V (ak)− pk.
Note that γ > %. Define T = {ak∗} ∪ {a! ∈ A | a! + ak∗ and V (a!) = V (ak∗)}. Let V ′
be the following type:
V ′(ar) ≡

V (ar) + %, if ar ∈ T\{aK}
V (ar) + γ, if ar = aK
V (ar), otherwise.
As V ′ is consistent with the underlying order + and D is rich, V ′ ∈ D.20
By Lemma 2(i), pk∗ ≤ p! for any a! ∈ T . Therefore, as V ′(a!) = V ′(ak∗), for all
a! ∈ T\{aK}, we have
V ′(a!)− p! ≤ V ′(ak∗)− pk∗ < V ′(aK)− pK , ∀a! ∈ T\{aK}.
Thus, ak -∈ T and Lemma 3(i) implies that f(V ′) -= a! for any ! ∈ T\{aK}. As
V ′(aK)−pK < V ′(ak)−pk, f(V ′) -= aK by Lemma 3(ii). Thus, f(V ′) = ak′ -∈ T∪{aK}.
But then,
0 = V ′(ak′)− V (ak′) < V ′(ak∗)− V (ak∗) = %
which violates W-Mon.
Proof of Lemma 4: By Lemma 2(ii) and the fact that a¯k ≥ vk ≥ 0 for all v ∈ D,
we have a¯k ≥ δk k−1 ≥ −δk−1 k ≥ 0.
20To verify the consistency of V ′ note the following. If a!′ + a! and a! ∈ T , a!′ -∈ T , a!′ -= aK
then select " > 0 small enough so that V ′(a!′) = V (a!′) ≥ V (a!) + " = V ′(a!). If aK + a!, a! ∈ T ,
then as γ > ", we have V ′(aK) ≥ V ′(a!) if V (aK) ≥ V (a!). Further, aK was chosen so that a! -+ aK
for any $ -= K.
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Let vk ≡ (a¯1, a¯2, ..., a¯k, 0, ..., 0) for any k = 0, 1, 2, ..., K (with v0 ≡ (0, 0, ..., 0) ).
Observe that under either bounded domain assumption A or B, vk ∈ D. Thus,
vk ∈ Y (q) for some q = 0, 1, ..., K. TBB(i) implies that vk -∈ Y (q) for any q > k,
and TBB(ii) implies that vk -∈ Y (q) for any q < k. Therefore, vk ∈ Y (k). Next,
let v(t) = (1 − t)vk−1 + tvk, t ∈ [0, 1], be a point on the straight line joining vk and
vk−1, k ≥ 1. Observe that v(t) = (a¯1, ..., a¯k−1, ta¯k, 0, ..., 0) ∈ D, ∀t ∈ [0, 1]. Thus,
v(t) ∈ Y (q) for some q. TBB implies that v(t) ∈ Y (k−1)∪Y (k). Because vk(t) = ta¯k
increases in t, there exists a t∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that v(t) ∈ Y (k − 1) for all t < t∗ and
v(t) ∈ Y (k) for all t > t∗. Thus,
t∗a¯k = lim
t↑t∗
vk(t) ≤ −δk−1 k ≤ δk k−1 ≤ lim
t↓t∗
vk(t) = t
∗a¯k
Hence, δk k−1 = −δk−1 k.
Proof of Lemma 5: W-Mon implies that
If
q∑
!=f(v)+1
v′! <
q∑
!=f(v)+1
v!, ∀q > f(v) then f(v′) ≤ f(v). (14)
If
f(v)∑
!=q+1
v′! >
f(v)∑
!=q+1
v!, ∀q < f(v) then f(v′) ≥ f(v). (15)
Observe that if v′, v, satisfy the hypotheses in (14) and (15) then f(v′) = f(v).
First, we prove that for any k = 0, 1, 2, ..., K,
{
v ∈ D|
k∑
!=q
v! ≥
k∑
!=q
δ! !−1, ∀q ≤ k,
q∑
!=k+1
v! ≤
q∑
!=k+1
δ! !−1, ∀q > k
}
⊆ cl[Y (k)]. (16)
There are two cases to consider.
Case A: (δ1 0, δ2 1, ..., δK K−1) ∈ D.21
Consider the point vˆk(%) = (δ1 0 + %1, ..., δk k−1 + %k, δk+1 k − %k+1, ..., δK − %K) where
%1, %2, ..., %K satisfy the following conditions:
(i) If [q ≤ k and δq q−1 = a¯q] or [q > k and δq q−1 = 0] then %q = 0.
(ii) If [q ≤ k and δq q−1 < a¯q] or [q > k and δq q−1 > 0] then %q > 0.
As (δ1 0, δ2 1, ..., δK K−1) ∈ D, there exist %1, %2, ..., %K satisfying (i) and (ii) above
such that vˆk(%) ∈ D.22 Consider any q < k. If δq+1 q < a¯q+1 then as vˆkq+1(%) > δq+1 q,
we know that vˆk(%) -∈ Y (q). If, instead, δq+1 q = a¯q+1 then (as %q+1 = 0) we have
vˆkq+1(%) = a¯q+1. Thus, TBB(ii) implies that vˆ
k(%) -∈ Y (q). Similarly, TBB(i) implies
21Lemma 4 implies that if domain assumption A is satisfied then we are in Case A.
22If domain assumption A is satisfied, this is easy to verify. If, instead, domain assumption B is
satisfied then "1, "2, ..., "K must be chosen to ensure that vˆk(") satisfies (6).
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that vˆk(%) -∈ Y (q) for q > k. Hence vˆk(%) ∈ Y (k). Therefore, (14) and (15) imply
that23{
v ∈ D |
k∑
!=q
v! >
k∑
!=q
(δ! !−1 + %!), ∀q ≤ k,
q∑
!=k+1
v! <
q∑
!=k+1
(δ! !−1 − %!), ∀q > k
}
⊂ Y (k).
One can construct a sequence (%n1 , %
n
2 , ..., %
n
K)→ 0 such that vˆk(%n) ∈ D. Taking limits
as %n → 0, we get{
v ∈ D |
k∑
!=q
v! >
k∑
!=q
δ! !−1, ∀q ≤ k,
q∑
!=k+1
v! <
q∑
!=k+1
δ! !−1, ∀q > k
}
⊂ Y (k),
which in turn implies (16).
Case B: (δ1 0, δ2 1, ..., δK K−1) -∈ D.24
For each k = 0, 1, 2, ..., K define
vk(%) =
{
v | vq = max[vq+1 a¯q
a¯q+1
, δq q−1 + %q], ∀q < k, δk k−1 + %k ≤ vk ≤ a¯k,
vq = min[vq−1
a¯q
a¯q−1
, δq q−1 − %q], ∀q > k
}
.
Any v ∈ vk(%) satisfies (6). Thus, provided %1, %2, ..., %K satisfy (i) and (ii) defined in
Case A, and are small enough, vk(%) ⊂ D [ = ∪Kq=0Y (q) ]. For any v ∈ vk(%), we have
vq ≥ δq q−1 + %q for any q ≤ k; thus vk(%) ∩ Y (q − 1) = ∅. Similarly, for any q > k,
vk(%) ∩ Y (q) = ∅. Thus, vk(%) ⊂ Y (k) for small enough %!’s . From (14) and (15)
applied to each v ∈ vk(%), we know that (with the qualification in footnote 23)
{
v ∈ D | vk > δk k−1 + %k,
k∑
!=q
v! > δk k−1 + %k +
k−1∑
!=q
max[v!+1
a¯!
a¯!+1
, δ! !−1 + %!], ∀q < k,
q∑
!=k+1
v! <
q∑
!=k+1
min[v!−1
a¯!
a¯!−1
, δ! !−1 − %!], ∀q > k
}
⊂ Y (k).
Taking limits as (%1, %2, ..., %K)→ 0, we see that{
v ∈ D | vk > δk k−1,
k∑
!=q
v! > δk k−1 +
k−1∑
!=q
max[v!+1
a¯!
a¯!+1
, δ! !−1], ∀q < k,
q∑
!=k+1
v! <
q∑
!=k+1
min[v!−1
a¯!
a¯!−1
, δ! !−1], ∀q > k
}
⊆ Y (k)
23If for some q ≤ k, δ! !−1 = a¯! for all $ = q, q + 1, ..., k then the corresponding strict inequality
in the set on the left hand side is replaced by a weak inequality. A similar change is made if for
some q > k, δ! !−1 = 0 for all $ = q, q + 1, ..., k. In either case, (i) implies that "! = 0 in the relevant
range. This ensures that the set on the left hand side is non-empty; the inclusion of this set in Y (k)
is implied by TBB together with (14) and (15).
24Domain assumption B must hold and (6) is violated by (δ1 0, δ2 1, ..., δK K−1).
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and therefore{
v ∈ D | vk ≥ δk k−1,
k∑
!=q
v! ≥ δk k−1 +
k−1∑
!=q
max[v!+1
a¯!
a¯!+1
, δ! !−1], ∀q < k,
q∑
!=k+1
v! ≤
q∑
!=k+1
min[v!−1
a¯!
a¯!−1
, δ! !−1], ∀q > k
}
⊆ cl[Y (k)].
That this last set inclusion is equivalent to (16) follows from the observation that
(6) implies that if δk k−1 +
∑k−1
!=q max[v!+1
a¯!
a¯!+1
, δ! !−1] >
∑k
!=q v! ≥
∑k
!=q δ! !−1 for some
q < k or if
∑k
!=q+1 min[v!−1
a¯!
a¯!−1
, δ! !−1] <
∑k
!=q+1 v! ≤
∑k
!=q+1 δ! !−1 for some q > k,
then v -∈ D. This establishes (16) for Case B.
Next, suppose that the set inclusion in (16) is strict. In particular, there exists
k, v ∈ cl[Y (k)] such that ∑k!=q′ v! < ∑k!=q′ δ! !−1, for some q′ < k.25 We may assume
WLOG that v ∈ Y (k)26 and that ∑k!=q v! ≥ ∑k!=q δ! !−1, ∀q = q′ + 1, ..., k. Therefore,
vq′ < δq′ q′−1 ≤ a¯q′ and ∑q!=q′ v! < ∑q!=q′ δ! !−1, ∀q = q′, q′ + 1, ..., k. Consider the
point vˆ ≡ (a¯1, a¯2, ..., a¯q′−1, vq′ + %ˆ, vq′+1, ..., vk, 0, ..., 0) where %ˆ > 0 is small enough
that vˆ ∈ D and ∑q!=q′ vˆ! < ∑q!=q′ δ! !−1, ∀q = q′, q′ + 1, ..., k. Thus, (16) implies that
vˆ ∈ cl[Y (q′ − 1)]. Suppose that vˆ ∈ Y (q′ − 1). But this violates (5) as ∑k!=q′ vˆ! >∑k
!=q′ v! and v ∈ Y (k). If, instead, vˆ ∈ cl[Y (q′ − 1)]\Y (q′ − 1) then there exists
v∗ ∈ Y (q′ − 1) which is arbitrarily close to vˆ and (5) is violated. Thus, for any
v ∈ cl[Y (k)] we have ∑k!=q v! ≥ ∑k!=q δ! !−1, ∀q ≤ k. A similar proof establishes that
if v ∈ cl[Y (k)] then ∀q > k, ∑q!=k+1 v! ≤ ∑q!=k+1 δ! !−1. Therefore, the set inclusion in
(16) can be replaced by an equality, i.e.,
cl[Y (k)] =
{
v ∈ D |
k∑
!=q
v! ≥
k∑
!=q
δ! !−1, ∀q ≤ k, &
q∑
!=k+1
v! ≤
q∑
!=k+1
δ! !−1, ∀q > k
}
. (17)
For any v ∈ Y (k) and any q < k,
k∑
!=1
v! −
k∑
!=1
δ! !−1 ≥
q∑
!=1
v! −
q∑
!=1
δ!,!−1 (18)
⇐⇒
k∑
!=q+1
v! ≥
k∑
!=q+1
δ! !−1.
The last inequality follows from (17). Thus, (18) is true; when v ∈ Y (k) the agent
cannot increase his payoffs by reporting a type v′ ∈ Y (q), q < k. Similarly, (18) is
true for q > k. Thus, the payment function pk defined in (8) implements f .
25From the definition of δk k−1 we know that q′ -= k.
26If v ∈ cl[Y (k)]\Y (k), then there exists v′ ∈ Y (k), v′ close to v, such that∑k!=q′ v′! <∑k!=q′ δ! !−1.
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